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Interest Rate Expectations Versus Forward Rates: 
Evidence From an Expectations Survey 
BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN 
FOLLOWING HICKS [91  AND LUTZ [11], economists have developed a substantial 
literature relating the forward interest rates implied by currently prevailing rates 
on  debts of differing maturity to market participants'  expectations  of interest 
rates in the future. Hicks suggested that implied forward rates might differ from 
the corresponding expected future rates by a liquidity premium, or term premium, 
and more recently Stiglitz [19] and others have formalized how market partici- 
pants' risk aversion would  give rise to such a premium. While in principle the 
premium could be either  positive or negative, the usual upward slope of the yield 
curve suggests a positive premium  that itself varies positively with the debt's 
term to maturity.  Kessel [10] subsequently  suggested that the premium  for a 
given maturity might vary with real economic  activity, and Culbertson [2] argued 
that relative outside debt supply quantities  should als' affect the premium. More 
recently Nelson [16] offered an explanation for the premium even in the absence 
of risk aversion, and Friedman [5] related  changes in the premium  to shifts in 
wealth ownership among heterogenous investors. 
An accompanying empirical literature has  repeatedly  tested each of these 
various hypotheses about forward rates and expected future rates, but usually 
with somewhat inconclusive results. A key reason for the weakness of much of 
this empirical literature has been the absence of independent  information about 
market participants'  expectations. Not surprisingly, the very early attempts  based 
on the assumption of perfect foresight were most unsuccessful and this approach 
quickly went out of fashion. The traditional  procedure since then has been either 
to apply the Hicks-Lutz theory  to derive expectations proxies from the same 
term-structure data that generate the forward rates, or to use some other device 
like autoregressive or 'rational' expectations proxies. In either case, any hypoth- 
esis submitted to statistical  testing is necessarily a joint hypothesis embodying 
both the relation of forward rates to expectations and the formation  of expecta- 
tions themselves. Failure of the hypothesis to conform to the data may then 
indicate  rejection of the proposition relating forward rates to expectations, or 
rejection of the identifying restrictions  imposed to derive the expectations proxy 
(or both). 
The object of this paper is to test  several familiar  hypotheses  about the 
relationship  between the forward rates implied by the term structure and interest 
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rate expectations, using the one ongoing systematic survey that samples market 
participants'  expectations.  The substitution  of survey data  for  overidentified 
constructions removes the principal source of ambiguity that has plagued much 
of the earlier empirical literature of the term structure. Nevertheless, because of 
limitations in the available data, it is possible to perform these tests only for the 
very short end of the maturity spectrum. 
Section I briefly describes the nature of the interest rate expectations survey 
and the calculation of the forward rate series from observed term structure data. 
Sections lI—V present  the results  of testing the hypotheses that the implied term 
premium is zero on average  (II), that it varies systematically with interest rate 
levels (III), that it varies with outside asset supplies (IV), and that it varies with 
economic activity  (V). Section  VI summarizes the findings of these tests and 
discusses their implications. 
I.  The Survey Data and the Forward Rates 
The Goldsmith-Nagan Bond and  Money Market Letter is a biweekly publication 
circulated  widely among  professional  financial market participants  including 
investors, traders and underwriters. Since September, 1969, the Goldsmith-Nagan 
Letter has  conducted a quarterly  survey of the interest rate expectations  of a 
selected panel of approximately fifty of its subscribers who are known to the 
publisher to be market professionals. The survey, conducted at the end of each 
calendar quarter, asks respondents to indicate their respective point expectations 
for each of a set of interest rates as of the close of the last business day of the 
coming quarter and of the quarter following. The two expectations series exploited 
here, below denoted RE1 and  RE2,  consist of the pairs of means of the survey 
respondents' simultaneously held one-quarter-ahead  and two-quarters-ahead ex- 
pectations of the 3-month U.S. Treasury bill rate.' 
Following Hicks, the forward rate of interest implied for one-period debts one 
period hence is 
F,=(l+R2)_l  (1) 
(1  R1) 
where R1 and R2 are the currently prevailing (spot) interest rates on one-period 
and two-period debts, respectively. Similarly, the forward rate implied for one- 




—  1  (2) 
where R3 is analogously the prevailing rate on three-period debts. The forward 
rates used below are constructed  according to (1) and (2) from the observed 
market rates on  3-,  6- and  9-month Treasury bills as of the close of the last 
business day of each calendar quarter. 
See Friedman [61 for  an analysis of the statistical properties of  these expectations as well as those 
for five other interest  rates. See Prell [181 for a more detailed description of the survey data. Rate Expectations  967 
The data consist of thirty-one quarterly observations beginning in September, 
1969.  In all cases  the reported discounted bill rates are adjusted to a coupon- 
equivalent yield basis. 
II.  Is There a Term Premium? 
Whether  implied forward interest rates are or are not identical to expected future 
interest rates has been a major question in monetary economics, for several good  reasons. At the theoretical level the presence or absence of a term premium bears 
importantly on the appropriateness  of treating all  interest-bearing  assets  as 
perfect substitutes, a key turning point for a number of fundamental  issues in 
monetary theory.2 At the empirical level, it is necessary to face the same question 
in  determining how far to disaggregate  among securities  in estimating  asset 
demand behavior. At the policy level, the usefulness of debt management policy 
(or the surrogate "Operation Twist" in the early 1960s), or the appropriateness of  the old "bills only" approach to open market operations, again depends on asset 
substitutability  properties to which a term premium  (or its absence) provides 
important clues.3 
Among the early tests for a term premium between interest rates on debts of 
different maturities, perhaps  the best known is Meiselinan's [12] work which used  a simple error-learning hypothesis to proxy the unobservable expectations. Mei- 
selman was unable to reject the hypothesis of no term premium. By contrast, 
subsequent  investigations of the term structure using more general expectations  mechanisms—for example, the work of Modigliani mid Sutch [14], Modigliani  and Shiller [13], and Nelson [lG]—typically has found evidence of a significant  term premium. Indeed, among recent studies, even in those that find no evidence 
of a significant premium the conclusion often turns less on the mean estimate 
than on its standard  error.4 
Given the survey expectations data and the implied forward rate  series de- 
scribed in Section I, it is straightforward to define the term premium relationship  between 6- and 3-month bills, and between 9- and 6-month bills, respectively, as 
TP1—F1-R 
TP2 = F2 -  RE2. 
In words, TP1 is the difference between the implied forward rate on one-period  debts one period hence and the one-period rate that market participants expect  to prevail one period hence; and TP2 is the analogous difference for one-period  debts two periods hence. 
The sample-period means and standard deviations of the two term premium  series are respectively m(TP1) = 0.56%, m(TP2) = 0.59%, s(TP1) = 0.45%, s(TP2)  = 0.68%. On the basis of this simple evidence, therefore,  it is impossible to reject 
2 
See, for example,  Tobin [201, Brunner and Meltrer [1] and Friedman [31. 
See, for example,  Tobin [211 and Modigliani  and Sutch  [14]. 
4llamburger  and Platt [8], for example, using data for 3-month and 6-month U.S. Treasury bills,  estimated the equivajent of —o in (4) below to be 0.30%. but with t-statistic only  1.1. 968  The Journal  of Finance  - 
the  null hypothesis of a  zero term premium  despite mean estimates  that are 
relatively large in comparison to prevailing interest rate levels.5 From (1) and (3), 
for example, TP1 = 0.56% means that 6-month rates will exceed 3-month rates by 
approximately 0.28%, even if the current 3-month rate is expected to continue to 
prevail three months hence. Similarly, TP2 = 0.59%  means that 9-month rates 
will exceed 6-month rates by approximately 0.20% even if the current 3-month 
rate is expected to continue to prevail both three months hence and six months 
hence. 
Simply looking at calculated means and standard deviations, however, is an 
incomplete way to test the hypothesis that the term premium as defined in (3) is 
zero. The proper test follows from relating the corresponding forward rates and 
expectations in the form 
Fia+f3REL±u,  (4) 
where u is a zero-mean finite-variance disturbance  term which is uncorrelated 
with REt. The "pure expectations theory" of the term structure  then corresponds 
to the null hypothesis 
Ho:  (a, /3) = (0, 1)  (5) 
(as well as lack of serial correlation in ui). 
The results of estimating (4) by ordinary least squares for the two data sets are 
F1 = —0.74  +  1.21R5  (R2 = .94, SE = 0.39%, DW= 1.45) 
(0.36)  (0.06) 
F2 = —1.66  +  1.36RE2  (J2 = .82, SE = 0.61%, DW= 1.32) 
(0.73)  (0.12) 
where  R2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted  for degrees of freedom, SE 
is the standard error of estimate, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, and the 
number in parentheses  beneath each coefficient is its standard error. In both 
cases the results not only warrant rejecting the joint null hypothesis  (5) but also 
(using a two-tailed t-test at the .05 significance level) warrant  rejecting separately 
the individual hypotheses a = 0 and /3 = 1.6 Hence it is clear that the inability to 
reject  the hypotheses m ( TP,) = 0, as noted above, is due to the implicit imposition 
of  /3 = 1, a restriction which the data strongly reject. Indeed, in both data sets the 
estimated /3 value is sufficiently greater  than unity to render the estimated a 
value negative. 
In sum, the evidence sharply rejects the "pure expectations" hypothesis that 
the market simply prices debts of different maturities  so as to satisfy the Hicks- 
Lutz condition with no term premium included.7 
The sample-period means of the observed interest rates on 3-, 6-, and 9-month bills are m  (R1) = 
6.13%, m(R2) = 6.44%, and m(R3) = 6.56%. 
6 In addition, the results for  F2 reject at the .05 level the hypothesis of  lack of  serial correlation in 
U2. 
An alternative interpretation of the data would be to take the forward rates as given and th ask 
whether the survey respondents, in forming their expectations, merely take the forward rate as the 
rate most likely to prevail. The data also warrant  rejecting the null hypothesis (5) in the alternative 
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III.  Does the Term Premium  Vary with Interest Rates? 
The rejection not only of a = 0 but also of $ = 1 in (4) immediately suggests that 
the term premium for a given maturity varies with the prevailing level of interest 
rates. Kessel first  argued that the term premium  is nonconstant,  and, among 
subsequent  more formal models of the term premium, several provide rationales 
for expecting the term premium to vary (usually positively) with interest rates. 
The results of estimating by ordinary least squares the relationship 
TI?, = a + 131R1 + $2R,,,_1 + u, 
are 
TP1 = —0.77  +  0.04R1 +  0.18R1,,_1  (2 = .39, SE = 0.37%, DW= 1.90) 
(0.31)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
TP2 = —1.04  +  0.28R2 —  0.04R2,1_1  (R2 = .27, SE = 0.55%, DW= 1.74). 
(0.49)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
In both cases, at least one of the pair ($i, $2) is significantly different from zero 
at the .05 level individually, and the associated F-statistics  warrant rejecting the 
null hypothesis 
Ho: /3 = $2  0 
at the .01 level. Analogous regressions of TP1 on R2, aiid TP2 on R1, yield roughly 
similar results. 
In sum, the evidence strongly indicates that the m'irket not only prices debts 
of different maturities so  as to set forward rates not equal to expected future 
interest rates but also does so in a way that systematically varies with current 
interest rate levels. 
IV. Does the Term Premium  Vary with Outside  Asset Supplies? 
In theories  of asset pricing based  on the equation  of choice-theoretic market 
demands to exogenous outside supplies, the relationships among market-clearing 
asset  prices (yields) typically vary with relative asset supplies.8 Under strong 
conditions describing market participants' willingness to substitute one asset for 
another,  however, relative  yields may be invariant  to relative asset supplies. 
Given the  government's  ability  to  determine  the  maturity structure of the 
outstanding  public debt via either debt management policy (the Treasury)  or 
open market operations (the Federal Reserve), it is not surprising that several 
contributions  to the previous  empirical literature  of the term structure have 
attempted to find evidence of an effect due to relative supplies of government 
securities of different maturities.9 
8 For  the explicit derivation of such a model given the assumption of  constant relative risk aversion, 
see Friedman [5]. 
See, for example, Modigliani and Sutch [15], Okun [17], and Harnbor and Weintraub [7]. With 
the exception of Okun's work, most such attempts  have produced negative results. For evidence 
relating the market-clearing yield on inside assets (corporate bonds) to the amount supplied, see 
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Tests  using survey data to deErc  the term premium  as above do not show 
strong evidence of systematic variation  of the term premium with simple measures 
of the relative  supplies of government securities. For the ratio of outstanding 
amounts of 3- and 6-month Treasury bills (RAT), for example, the ordinary least- 
squares results are 
TP1 = —0.51  +  0.56RAT  (R2 = .04, SE = 0.45%, DW= 1.15) 
(0.70)  (0.36) 
TP2 = —1.17  +  0.91RAT  (R2 = .06, SE = 0.67%, DW  1.46). 
(1.03)  (0.53) 
Here the coefficient on the ratio of outstandings  is significantly different from 
zero at the .10 level but not the .05 level in the equation for the two-period-hence 
premium, and not even at the .10 level in the equation for the one-period-hence 
premium. Similarly, for the mean maturity of the entire outstanding Treasury 
debt (MAT), the ordinary least-squares results are 
TP1 =  0.26  0.OO8MAT  (R2 = .03, SE = 0.47%, DW= 1.03) 
(0.64)  (0.017) 
TP2 = —0.70  +  0.O35MAT  (R2 = .03, SE = 0.68%, DW= 1.31). 
(0.94)  (0.025) 
Here the coefficient on the mean maturity variable is significantly different from 
zero at the .10 level in neither equation. More complicated equations, relating  the 
term premium to lagged values of the ratio or mean maturity variable, or to both 
at once, yield similarly negative results.1° 
In sum, the use  of survey expectations instead of constructed  expectations 
proxies does not yield evidence that the term premium at the very short end of 
the maturity spectrum varies systematically with the maturity structure of the 
outstanding  U.S. Treasury securities. 
V.  Does the Term Premium Vary with Economic Activity? 
The contributions of Kessel and others provide grounds for believing that the 
term premium will vary not only according to interest  rate levels, as shown above, 
but also according to any of several dimensions of economic activity. Plausible 
examples of such variables in this context include the unemployment rate, the 
growth rate of real gross national product, and the rate of increase of prices (the 
GNP deflator), all as indicators of various cyclical aspects of economic activity. 
Additional  plausible  examples include  the  growth rate  of the  money  stock 
(M —  1) and the federal government deficit, as indicators of monetary and fiscal 
policy, respectively. 
Table 1 shows the results of estimating by ordinary least squares the relation- 
ship 
°The joint relationship  between TP1 and the variable set (RAT, RAT-I, MAT, MAT1) does 
yield F  (4, 25)  2.89 versus a critical value of  2.76 at the .05 level; but one "significant" result in about 
twenty combinations is no sign  of a genuine relation. Rate Expectations  971 
Table 1 
Tests for the Relation of the Term Premium with Economic Activity 
X  —  a  SE  DW  F(2,26) 
=  + yIx + y2X,I + 
U  1.17  0.25  —0.36  .16  0.43%  1.58  3.74k' 
(0.38)  (0.18)  (0.17) 
Y  0.69  —10.70  —13.53  .24  0.41%  1.84  547h 
(0.09)  (6.60)  (6.60) 
P  —0.20  38.88  8.31  .32  0.38%  1.89  7.73 
(0.20)  (18.29)  (18.26) 
M  1.18  —23.79  —21.23  .09  0.45%  1.36  2.33 
(0.31)  (18.57)  (18.05) 
G  0.74  0.005  0.003  .08  0.45%  1.19  2.23 
(0.13)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
TP2 = a + yiX + y2X,1 + u 
U  1.20  0.28  —0.40  .07  0.63%  1.70  2.08 
(0.56)  (0.26)  (0.25) 
Y  0.68  —15.83  —9.58  .11  0.61%  1.86  2.68c 
(0.14)  (9.99)  (9.99) 
P  —0.34  11.03  44.45  .21  0.58%  1.83  465b 
(0.31)  (27.66)  (27.61) 
M  0.91  —12.78  —14.60  .05  0.66%  1.55  0.39 
(0.46)  (27.73)  (26.96) 
G  0.71  —0.003  0.011  .04  0.64%  1.65  1.52 
_________ (0.18)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Notes:  U = unemployment rate  = significant at .01 level 
Y = growth rate of  real income  '=  significant at .05 level 
P =  rate of  increase of prices  = significant at .10 level 
M = growth rate of money stock 
G  government deficit 
TP, =  + yjX+  y2X,_i + u1  (8) 
where X in turn represents  each of these five variables. Especially for the one- 
period-ahead term  premium, the F-statistics warrant  rejecting  the null hypothesis 
Ho:yj=y20  (9) 
for the three indicators of overall economic activity. By contrast, the F-statistics 
do not warrant rejecting the null hypothesis for either economic policy indicator 
in the equation for either term premium. 
On the surface it appears as if the results shown in Table 1 provide evidence 
relating the term premium to macroeconomic activity. Nevertheless, since the 
results presented in Section III above relate the term premium to interest rate 
levels, and since interest rate levels  also vary systematically  with  economic 
activity, it is necessary to investigate further in order to unravel the effect of 
economic activity from the effect  of interest rate levels. Table 2  presents F- 
statistics  for separate tests of the null hypotheses  (7) and (9), within the joint 
relationship 972  The Journal of  Finance 
Table 2 
F-Statistics  for Joint Relations 
TP = a + f31R -f- /32R1, + yiX +  -4-  U 
X  Ho:J3=p2=O 
U  0.70 
Y  443h  1.33 
P  2.35  1.07 
Al  7.24k  0.95 
G  541b  1.14 
TP2 = a + /31R2 + /32R2,., + 'yiX + -y2X,.1 + u 
X  IPLJO  Ho:yi=y2=O 
U  524h  1.49 
Y  6.02  2.67r 
P  2.92  1.68 
M  5.88a  0.43 
G  7.73k  1.19 
Notes:  See Table 1. 
TP1 = a + /31R + f32R i  + yiX + yzXt-i + ii,,  (10) 
where X  in turn is each of the five economic activity variables considered in Table 
1. For all variables except price inflation, the results make clear that the basic 
relation is between  the term premium  and interest rate levels,  not economic 
nctivity, and that the appearance of a significant relation  in Table 1 is due merely 
to the correlation between X and R; X adds nothing significant to the explanation 
of the term premium after allowing for R," but R does so after allowing for X. 
The price inflation variable and the (nominal) interest rate level are sufficiently 
correlated that neither adds anything  significant after allowing  for the other. 
In sum, the evidence supports a relationship  between the term premium and 
simple indicators  of economic activity, but only to the  extent that the term 
premium varies with interest  rate levels, and interest rate levels in turn vary with 
economic activity. The evidence does not support a relationship between the 
term premium and simple indicators  of economic policy. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The statistical results assembled in this paper provide evidence disconfirming the 
"pure expectations theory" of the term structure of interest rates. The market 
does not price  debts  of different maturity so  that implied forward rates  are 
identical  10  expected future interest rates, but instead incorporates a positive 
term premium in rates on longer-term debts. Moreover, the premium for a given 
maturity varies positively with the level of prevailing interest rates. By contrast, 
the simple experiments reported here show no evidence of  independent systematic 
variation of the term premium either with relative supplies of outside assets or 
with familiar indicators of economic activity and monetary and fisc.l policy. 
"The effect of Y in the equation for TP2 is an exception, but one in ten at the .10 level again 
constitutes no genuine evidence. Rate Expectations  973 
These results are highly limited, of course, in that they focus on'y on the very 
short end of the debt maturity spectrum—only out to nine months. Nevertheless, 
they provide new information bearing on familiar questions, and they suggest the 
usefulness  of exploiting survey data on expectations  whenever  such data are 
available. 
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